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The Three Conundrums: Doctrinal, Theoretical,
and Practical Confusion in the Law of Sexually
Explicit Speech
By KYLA P. GARRETT WAGNER* & P. BROOKS FULLER**

ABSTRACT
In First Amendment law, one rarely disputed notion is that sexually explicit
speech is less valuable than so-called “core” forms of expression, such as
political discourse. This study revives that dispute with a focus on the
Supreme Court’s justifications for categorizing sexually explicit speech as
“low-value” in the first place. The analysis reveals three conundrums
plaguing the Court’s jurisprudence: categorizing restrictions on sexually
explicit speech; interpreting the value and harms of sexually explicit speech;
and assessing the evidence (or lack thereof) for restrictions on sexually
explicit speech. This article explains how these conundrums should be
resolved in sexually explicit speech cases with an emphasis on adopting an
analytical framework that requires substantiation similar to intermediate
constitutional scrutiny as in commercial speech cases.

INTRODUCTION
State and local governments are often described as “laboratories of
democracy.”1 America’s federal system encourages lawmakers to conduct
democratic experimentation on economic, political, and social issues,
*
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1
See Hannah J. Wiseman & Dave Owen, Federal Laboratories of Democracy, 52 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 1119 (2018). Justice Louis Brandeis coined the laboratory metaphor in New
State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, a Fourteenth Amendment due process case involving an Oklahoma
statute that required companies to obtain a state-issued license to produce and sell ice. 285
U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“To stay experimentation in things social and
economic is a grave responsibility. Denial of the right to experiment may be fraught with
serious consequences to the nation. It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that
a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social
and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.”).
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including the regulation of sex and sexually explicit expression. Since the
early colonial era,2 government officials have taken a keen interest in crafting
solutions to perceived problems purportedly caused by sexually explicit
speech. During the last twenty years especially, state and local governments
have focused legislative experimentation on perceived public health
problems caused by adult entertainment businesses, producing a mix of
results in terms of success and sustainability along with some ingenious and
oddly specific regulatory distillates.3 For example, Los Angeles requires
adult movie theaters and bookstores to be at least 1,000 feet from one another
within business districts.4 To prevent nude and semi-nude erotic
performances, Erie, Pennsylvania, requires female erotic dancers to wear Gstrings over their pubic area and pasties over their nipples.5 The State of
California proposed mandatory condom use by pornographic film actors
during the production of sex scenes.6
These restrictions are grounded in a powerful, if not taken-forgranted, presumption in First Amendment doctrine that sexually explicit
speech is less valuable than political, scientific, literary, and ideological
expression ranging from the ordinary to the extreme. Thus, speakers and
purveyors of sexually explicit content have limited latitude to “speak” as
they wish, and the government retains substantial power to experiment with
regulations that impact these speakers’ discourses about sex. And despite the
speakers’ efforts to overturn each of the regulations described above on the
grounds that they violate the First Amendment’s guarantees of freedom of
speech, courts have repeatedly and resoundingly emphasized that sexually

2

See GEOFFREY R. STONE, SEX AND THE CONSTITUTION: SEX,
FROM AMERICA’S ORIGINS TO THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (2017).
3

RELIGION,

AND

LAW

Id. The range of government regulations on sexually explicit speech include search
and seizure procedures for sexually oriented businesses, censorship and licensure schemes,
and advertising regulations.
4
City of L.A. v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425 (2002).
5
City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277 (2000).
6
Vivid Ent., LLC v. Fielding, 774 F.3d 566 (9th Cir. 2014) (dismissing Vivid
Entertainment’s argument that the law was an unconstitutional infringement on pornography
actors’ and producers’ First Amendment rights). In 2016, a California state initiative known
as Proposition 60: the California Safer Sex in the Adult Film Industry Act, was put on the
state ballot for public referendum. The proposition, which was an expansion of a Los Angeles
County ordinance that passed in 2012, called for mandatory condom use and other barrierbased safe sex practices by adult film actors during the production of hardcore sex scenes.
L.A. CTY., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11.39). The statewide proposition ultimately
failed by a margin of nearly one million votes but remains in effect in Los Angeles. California
Proposition 60 - Condoms in Pornographic Films Initiative - Results: Rejected, NEW YORK
TIMES,
(Aug.
1,
2017,
11:23
AM
ET),
https://www.nytimes.com/elections/2016/results/california-ballot-measure-60-adult-filmhealth-reqs.
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explicit speech is unequivocally low-value.7 But what rationale or evidence,
if any, justifies these legal conclusions and practical results? In this article,
we probe that question by analyzing the empirical and logical substance of
the Supreme Court’s applications of low-value theory to regulations of
sexually explicit speech.
American governments have regulated sexually explicit speech for
centuries,8 but the regulatory schemes like the kind in California and
Pennsylvania described above first emerged in the 1970s,9 during a period
when American society’s relationship with sexually explicit speech was
significantly different than in the 21st century. Popular television programs
of those days showed married couples sleeping in separate beds,10 and films
were outlawed for depicting promiscuity and infidelity.11 However, only a
few generations later, one of the most popular shows on television depicted
unmarried couples fighting over the last condom,12 and another included a
plotline in which a pornographic film star ran a legitimate campaign for
public office.13 Rather than being confined permanently to a seedy blacklist,
sexual content became considerably more mainstream. Likewise, decades of
public opinion research repeatedly demonstrates that United States citizens
show broad support for freedoms of sexually explicit speech, including

7
The Supreme Court has recognized that nearly all regulation on adult entertainment
is content-based, but that pornography’s low-value justifies the use of intermediate scrutiny
for the purposes of First Amendment analysis. See Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. at 448
(Kennedy, J., concurring).
8
See Stone, supra note 2.
9
In 1972, the Supreme Court decided Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., which
tested the constitutionality of a Detroit zoning ordinance restricting the location of adult
entertainment businesses. 427 U.S. at 70. The Court recognized that the First Amendment
affords limited protection to sexually explicit speech and adult businesses, but ultimately
upheld the regulation. Id.
10
Michael Asimow, Divorce in the Movies: From the Hays Code to Kramer vs.
Kramer, 24 LEGAL STUD. F. 221, 235 n.65 (2000); JACK VIZZARD, SEE NO EVIL: LIFE INSIDE
A HOLLYWOOD CENSOR 114 (1st ed. 1970).
11
See, e.g., Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 365 U.S. 43 (1961).
12
In the 1994, NBC aired the popular TV series, Friends, which told the story of six
friends living and working in New York City. Part of the storyline included the romantic
relationships of the friends, which included explicit conversations between the characters
about birth control and condom use. Friends: The One Where Dr. Ramoray Dies (NBC
television broadcast Mar. 21, 1996).
13
In 2009, NBC aired the popular TV series, Parks & Recreation, which told the story
of a local Indiana Parks Department and its employees. A reoccurring character of the series
was a fictional pornographic film actress, who at one point in the series ran for a seat on the
local city council. Parks & Recreation: The Debate (NBC television broadcast Apr. 26, 2012).
Art occasionally imitates life. In June 2020, former pornographic film actor Juan Melecio
filed to run for a seat on the Wilton Manor commission. Kyle Spinner, Florida porn actor
running for local office, CBS12.COM (June 10, 2020), https://cbs12.com/news/local/floridaporn-actor-running-for-local-office.
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pornography access and use.14 Coupled together, changes in mainstream
media and strong public support for sexually explicit speech freedom call
into question a sexually explicit speech jurisprudence based predominantly
on the notion that sexually explicit speech is low-value.15
Courts often look to legal history and precedent for answers to
perceived social problems, but the longstanding First Amendment
jurisprudence for sexually explicit speech may not reflect current or
developing social attitudes toward the relative value of sexually explicit
speech. Alternatively, as regulatory experimentation on sexually explicit
speech continues, courts may better meet the moment by consulting
empirical social science. By identifying and unpacking the Court’s lowvalue approach to sexually explicit speech, this research sheds light on why
sexually explicit speech was classified as low-value and proposes a
framework for how sexually explicit speech (and government regulation of
sexually explicit speech) should be treated in the future.
To do this, this article explores Young v. American Mini Theatres,
Inc.,16 the pivotal case in which the Court first adopted the low-value
approach to sexually explicit speech. Examination of the Supreme Court’s
doctrinal move in Young and its “low-value theory” progeny17 revealed three
pressing conundrums—the categorical, the interpretive, and the
evidentiary—that have led to doctrinal fractures among the Justices that
should be resolved. These three conundrums arise from the Court’s struggles
to categorize restrictions on sexually explicit speech, interpret its value (and
related harms), and assess relevant empirical evidence in sexually explicit
14
Polls from the 1990s found that sexually explicit speech, specifically speech dealing
with nudity and sexually suggestive behaviors like nude dancing, is the second mostsupported type of expression, falling just behind political speech and tying with religious
speech. Julie L. Andsager, A Constant Tension: Public Support for Free Expression, 38 STAN.
J. INT’L L. 3, 7 (2002). Additionally, recent studies on attitudes towards specific types of
sexually explicit speech, such as pornography, found citizens’ attitudes toward sexually
explicit speech are generally positive and that the use of sexually explicit speech is socially
acceptable. Joseph Price et al., How Much More XXX Is Generation X Consuming? Evidence
of Changing Attitudes and Behaviors Related to Pornography Since 1973, 53 J. SEX RSCH. 12
(2016); see also, e.g., Jason S. Carroll et al., Generation XXX: Pornography Acceptance and
Use Among Emerging Adults, 23 J. ADOLESCENT RSCH. 6 (2008).
15
Although the First Amendment does not permit total suppression of sexually explicit
speech, the Supreme Court has stated that sexually explicit speech is considered to have little
or no social importance and therefore receives little to no First Amendment protection. See
Young, 427 U.S. at 70 (“Moreover, even though we recognize that the First Amendment will
not tolerate the total suppression of erotic materials that have some arguably artistic value, it
is manifest that society’s interest in protecting this type of expression is of a wholly different,
and lesser, magnitude than the interest in untrammeled political debate that inspired Voltaire’s
immortal comment.”).
16
427 U.S. at 50.
17
FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978); City of Erie, 529 U.S. 277; United
States v. Playboy Ent. Grp., 529 U.S. 803 (2000).
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speech cases. Failure to resolve these three conundrums risks further
muddling a doctrine in desperate need of reformation. Based on these
findings, we recommend several incremental doctrinal fixes to bring the law
and protections of sexually explicit speech into harmony with a society that
values sexually explicit speech considerably more than the law recognizes.
CASE SELECTION & THE RESEARCH
To be clear, this study focuses on the regulation of protected forms
of sexual speech and expression,18 referred to herein as “sexually explicit
speech,” and not unprotected obscenity. From 1957 to 1973, the Supreme
Court decided a series of cases, mostly related to criminal obscenity
prosecutions, that laid out the modern framework for distinguishing
protected sexually explicit speech from unprotected obscenity. Although the
obscenity cases are relevant because they lay out much of the conceptual
groundwork for the cases studied here, they are not the focus of the analysis.
Starting with Roth v. United States19 and blossoming in Miller v.
California,20 the Supreme Court fashioned a modern obscenity framework
that manifested in the Miller test.21 Soon after, in 1976, the Court decided
Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc.,22 which proved to be a pivotal case
regarding questions of the value and protection of sexually explicit speech.
Young called into question the constitutionality of zoning laws in
Detroit, Michigan, that restricted the locations of adult movie theaters.
Finding the laws constitutional, the Court reasoned that sexually explicit
speech, such as adult film, is not entirely without First Amendment
protection, but such speech fails to carry material value worthy of heightened
18

This study does not include cases referring to illegal forms of sexually explicit
speech. Thus, cases like New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982) – the case denying
protection for sexually explicit speech involving children – that reference to Young v.
American Mini Theatres, Inc., but concern illegal forms of speech were removed to avoid
muddying the case analysis.
19
354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957). The Court established in Roth that obscenity is beyond the
protection of the First Amendment because this type of speech is without social importance:
“All ideas having even the slightest redeeming social importance—unorthodox ideas,
controversial ideas, even ideas hateful to the prevailing climate of opinion—have the full
protection of the guaranties, unless excludable because they encroach upon the limited area
of more important interests. But implicit in the history of the First Amendment is the rejection
of obscenity as utterly without redeeming social importance.”
20
413 U.S. 15 (1973).
21
Id. at 24. The three-prong obscenity test referred to as the Miller test consists of the
following: (a) whether ‘the average person, applying contemporary community standards’
would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; (b) whether the
work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by
the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary,
artistic, political, or scientific value.
22
427 U.S. 50 (1976).
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protection, like that of political speech. Specifically, Justice John Paul
Stevens, writing for the majority, argued, “[I]t is manifest that society’s
interest in protecting this [sexually explicit] expression is of a wholly
different, and lesser, magnitude than the interest in untrammeled political
debate….”23 Decades later, the Court’s perception of sexually explicit
speech has held steadfast through cases involving a variety of sexually
explicit content, from profane words to nude dancing.
Young’s significance to sexually explicit speech law guided the case
selection for this analysis. Following Young, the Supreme Court heard three
freedom-defining cases for sexually explicit speech—Federal
Communications Commission (F.C.C.) v. Pacifica Foundation,24 City of Erie
v. Pap’s A.M.,25 and United States v. Playboy—each of which engaged with
the Young precedent.26 Each case establishes a significant part of the law on
sexually explicit speech: Pacifica is the pivotal case in which the Court
affirmed the F.C.C.’s power to regulate indecent content in broadcast media
during daytime hours when children may be in the audience; Pap’s A.M.
affirmed that although nude dancing is a protected form of free expression,
it is subject to regulation even when the regulation interferes with the speech;
and Playboy reinforced the exceptions and protections of adults to access
sexually explicit content on cable channels.
The Young progeny helped cement the protections and restrictions
on sexually explicit speech. In each case, the Court reaffirmed that sexually
explicit speech is low-value. It is this low-value status that this research aims
to better understand. This study is not the first to explore and question
whether sexually explicit speech is low-value, but it does sharpen the focus
to the line of cases stemming from Young. Broadly, legal scholars have
analyzed many of these same cases to argue that the value of sexually explicit
speech often depends heavily on its surrounding context, such as the medium
of expression and the genre (e.g. political commentary, humor, or noneducational content).27 For example, Christopher Schultz elegantly observed
that the value of sexually explicit speech is fluid and can “float” between
levels of protection depending on its context.28 But amid these studies on
sexually explicit speech, a discussion of the Court’s underlying justifications
(if any) for the low-value approach to sexually explicit speech is glaringly
absent. Thus, this research aims to fill this gap by interrogating the legal,

23

Id. at 70-71.
Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726.
25
City of Erie, 529 U.S. 277.
26
Playboy Ent. Grp., 529 U.S. 803.
27
Christopher M. Schultz, Content-Based Restrictions on Free Expression:
Reevaluating the High Versus Low Value Speech Distinction, 41 ARIZ. L. REV. 573, 597-99
(1999).
28
Id.
24
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theoretical, practical, and empirical justifications that have built the doctrine
of sexually explicit speech.

THE THREE CONUNDRUMS
Three analytical conundrums characterize the cases reviewed in this
study. The first, the categorical conundrum, entails the Court’s struggle to
categorize restrictions on sexually explicit expression for First Amendment
analysis purposes. The second, the interpretive conundrum, involves the
Court’s struggle to clearly articulate the communicative values and social
harms related to sexually explicit expression. The third, the evidentiary
conundrum, focuses on the Court’s inconsistent approach to the nature and
amount of evidence required to sustain such restrictions. Together, these
conundrums cause fracture among the justices and create muddled doctrine
in need of reformation in light of existing and nascent social science related
to the public’s attitudes toward sexually explicit speech.
THE CATEGORICAL CONUNDRUM
The most obvious point of fracture is how the justices choose to
categorize incursions on the protected, though purportedly low-value, First
Amendment activities involved in sexually explicit speech cases. Each of the
focal cases, including Young v. American Mini Theatres and its three
progeny cases analyzed here, involved some dispute over whether the
regulations of sexually explicit speech were content-based regulations
requiring heightened constitutional scrutiny or content-neutral regulations
deserving of less exacting, intermediate scrutiny. The case law on sexually
explicit expression is dominated by this doctrinally critical categorical
conundrum.
The following section explores the Court’s efforts to resolve this
categorical conundrum and the implications of its failure to render a coherent
doctrinal position on laws that explicitly target protected sexually explicit
expression and adult businesses. How the Court resolves this conundrum, if
it chooses to revisit any of its landmark cases,29 could portend upheaval in
the First Amendment landscape underlying sexually explicit speech.
Additionally, if the Court were to extend its reasoning from paradigmshifting cases such as Reed v. Town of Gilbert,30 which raised critical First
29

See FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 567 U.S. 239, 259 (2012) (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring) (“In my view, the Court’s decision in FCC v. Pacifica Foundation was wrong
when it issued. Time, technological advances, and the Commission’s untenable rulings in the
cases now before the Court show why Pacifica bears reconsideration.”) (internal citations
omitted).
30
576 U.S. 155 (2015).
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Amendment categorization issues, then the doctrine of sexually explicit
speech could be primed for renaissance and reimagination.
Every restriction of sexually explicit speech is content-based
The First Amendment is not content-agnostic. As other scholars
have discussed capably, a system of First Amendment protection constructed
hierarchically necessarily invites the Court to separate protected content
from unprotected content.31 As the Court stated clearly in Young v. American
Mini Theatres, “[t]he question whether speech is, or is not, protected by the
First Amendment often depends on the content of the speech.”32 In that
sense, every restriction on expression must take into account the content
restricted. However, the government may not restrict protected expression
when the primary motivation for the restriction is that the government
disfavors the communicative content. Unpopular speech must be given
breathing space. In Young, however, the Court sanctioned a local
government’s efforts to channel a broad category of disfavored expression
(adult films) into particular geographical areas. As the theater operators in
Young argued, the restrictions foisted financial burdens on them solely
because of the content of the films they showed. The majority in Young
categorized the zoning regulations as time, place, or manner regulations
because they did not clearly disfavor a particular political or social viewpoint
within the adult film genre. If the regulation had applied only to adult theaters
showing pornography that ridiculed then-President Gerald Ford, then the
Court likely would have analyzed the restriction as content-based. Instead,
the Court permitted the regulation of an entire sector of business on the basis
of content using the doctrinal maneuver of content-neutrality.
This pattern emerged in all of the cases analyzed in this study. For
example, in FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, the Court searched the record
unsuccessfully for evidence that federal regulators had penalized the Pacifica
Foundation because of the political or social message underlying George
Carlin’s use of vulgar language.33 Without such evidence, the regulation of
non-obscene, indecent expression was allowed to stand. The Court has
permitted more sweeping regulations of large swaths of content purportedly
done for content-neutral purposes such as protecting property values and
minimizing crime.34 In doing so, the Court has fashioned a gargantuan
exemption to protection for sexually explicit speech that would be
inconceivable in the realms of political or commercial speech.
31

See, e.g., Genevieve Lakier, The Invention of Low-Value Speech, 128 HARV. L. REV.

1 (2015).
32

Young, 427 U.S. at 66.
Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. at 746.
34
City of Erie, 529 U.S. 277.
33
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City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M. represents the most striking instance of
the Court’s application of the content-neutral O’Brien standard to a
regulation aimed to restrict sexual content. The decision also hangs on a
precarious evidentiary record, which will be discussed later in this article.
Whereas Young v. American Mini Theatres involved a regulation that
prohibited two adult film establishments within 1,000 feet of one another,
City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M. categorically prohibited public nudity in public
places, including businesses of public accommodation.35 Although “being in
a state of nudity is not an inherently expressive condition,” the Court
nevertheless affirmed that “nude dancing of the type at issue [in City of Erie]
is expressive conduct, although we think that it falls only within the outer
ambit of the First Amendment’s protection.”36 Although the Court did not
define the contours of that outer ambit, it clearly brought nude dancing
within the First Amendment’s protective reach insofar as the dancing took
place inside a private or quasi-private place and not openly in public space.
But lawmakers in Erie, Pennsylvania, harbored no tolerance for nude
dancing, banning it outright and in a manner that punished only adult nude
dancing and left untouched supposedly highbrow theater. Indeed, legal
counsel for the City of Erie admitted in an earlier proceeding that the ban on
public nudity would not apply to stage productions of “Equus” or “Hair,”
both of which are stage plays involving full nudity.37 The city had clearly
identified a disfavored form of nude expressive conduct, erotic dancing, and
targeted it under a more sweeping, though facially neutral, public nudity
ordinance.
The categorical conundrum manifested in the Pap’s A.M.’s
plurality’s use of the O’Brien test for expressive conduct as the dominant
analytical framework. In dissent, Justice Stevens argued that the regulation
ultimately worked a total ban, not an incidental burden on speech, rendering
O’Brien inappropriate:
If one assumes that the same erotic message is conveyed by nude
dancers as by those wearing miniscule costumes, one means of
expressing that message is banned; if one assumes that the
messages are different, one of those messages is banned. In either
event, the ordinance is a total ban.38
Justice Stevens went on to suggest that the Court’s use of secondary effects
justifications for limiting speech were only constitutionally tenable in

35

Id. at 282-83.
Id. at 289.
37
Id. at 328 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
38
Id. at 319 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
36
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circumstances where the market for such speech could survive.39 This was
plainly not the case under Erie’s total ban on nude dancing. It was on this
basis that the dissenting justices in City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M. urged their
brethren to strike down the ordinance, arguing that the government bore the
burden of proving a higher-order government interest and narrow tailoring
given Erie’s “near obsessive preoccupation with a single target of the law,”
nude dancing.40
Young v. American Mini Theatres looms large in City of Erie v.
Pap’s A.M. The plurality maintained that whatever illicit motive lawmakers
used to craft the public nudity ban, O’Brien required the Court to look only
at the constitutionality of the statute as written.41 All that Erie lawmakers had
to show was a reasonable belief that the same secondary effects that
threatened Detroit, the city whose ordinance was at issue in Young, would
threaten Erie. Despite many indications that the City of Erie had singled out
the adult establishment, Kandyland, because of its erotic messaging, the
Court concluded that the matter was properly resolved as a content-neutral,
secondary effects case. The Court did not require the City of Erie to make a
stronger showing that the ordinance was necessary to directly or materially
advance a more compelling government interest than what is required under
intermediate scrutiny.
The existing case law on sexually explicit speech presents a
seemingly intractable categorization problem. Many of the regulations of
sexually oriented businesses are glaringly and often admittedly, based on
content or the identity of the speaker. In other contexts and for other speech
types, the Supreme Court habitually condemns such regulations by analyzing
them against a rigorous, “fatal in fact” standard of strict constitutional
scrutiny.42 However, in the context of sexually oriented businesses, the Court
has sanctioned the use of the content-neutral O’Brien test, a much less
exacting standard, even when the record contains evidence that lawmakers
specifically targeted disfavored speakers on the basis of the content they
purvey, which Justice Stevens’ dissent clearly opposes in City of Erie v.
Pap’s A.M. 43
The Supreme Court’s decision in Reed v. Town of Gilbert44 calls into
question the viability of the regulatory scheme upheld in City of Erie v. Pap’s
A.M. Although Reed v. Town of Gilbert did not involve sexually explicit
speech, it represents a paradigm shift in the Court’s approach to identifying

39

Id. at 319-20.
Id. at 330.
41
Id. at 292.
42
Gerald Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court:
A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972).
43
City of Erie, 529 U.S. at 328 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
44
Reed, 576 U.S. 155.
40
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content-based restrictions and contributes an additional layer of uncertainty
to the existing categorical conundrum. Reed is an important departure from
the cases discussed here insofar as it makes clear that content-based
restrictions presumptively target expression on the basis of its
communicative content.45 Implicit here is that if a court classifies a
regulation as content-based, then that means the regulation necessarily
targets communication. This is a significant shift from the central lessons of
Young and its progeny. As we discussed above, the dominant paradigm
arising out of Young holds that some content-based restrictions regulate
communication whereas others regulate the effects of communication,
placing secondary effects regulations on different (and more governmentfriendly) constitutional footing. Reed is far less equivocal. Writing for the
majority in Reed, Justice Clarence Thomas stated that a content-based
restriction, subject to strict scrutiny, applies to protected communication
because of the “topic discussed or the idea or the message expressed.”46
Considering the Court’s reasoning in City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M. and
taking the Court in Pap’s A.M. at its word, an erotic message likely qualifies
as a topic and its non-obscene depiction qualifies as expression. Therefore,
the holding in Reed presents one possible avenue for extending fuller First
Amendment protection to sexually explicit speech that is targeted on the
basis of its sexual subject matter. At a minimum, Reed suggests that the
Court has not resolved the categorical conundrum the runs through the case
law on sexually explicit speech. If anything, it has further complicated the
doctrine.
THE INTERPRETIVE CONUNDRUM – FINDING THE MESSAGE IN SEXUALLY
EXPLICIT SPEECH
Although the Justices roundly agree that sexually explicit speech
deserves some modicum of First Amendment protection47—it is impossible
to quantify how much or qualify what kind—the majority opinions vacillate
between theoretical justifications for protection. From time to time, the
Justices have invoked the marketplace of ideas, an external, consequentialist
theoretical framework concerned with speech’s contributions to public
discourse. At others, autonomy (or self-fulfillment) theory has characterized
the majority position. These opinions call on us to examine how the Court
applies a value structure to the unfamiliar.

45
Id. at 161 (“Content-based laws—those that target speech based on its
communicative content—are presumptively unconstitutional and may be justified only if the
government proves that they are narrowly tailored to serve compelling state interests.”).
46
Id.
47
See, e.g., Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. at 743; City of Erie, 529 U.S. at 285.
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The interpretative conundrum surrounding speech’s value is
especially dynamic. The Supreme Court’s collective difficulty with
confronting social and technological change has been taunted occasionally.48
Memoirs tell of Supreme Court justices, popcorn in hand, awkwardly
watching the pornographic films to prepare for oral argument on docketed
obscenity cases.49 Although sometimes comical, one oft-repeated concern is
that the members of the Court struggle to understand unfamiliar technologies
and texts. In the case law on sexually explicit speech, this struggle manifests
as an interpretive conundrum that feeds directly back into the Court’s
discussion of the value of sexually explicit speech. In the cases examined for
this study, the Court routinely struggles to articulate in explicit terms the
communicative value of erotic texts or sexually expressive conduct, yet in
many cases, the justices have no trouble concluding that such texts lie at the
periphery of First Amendment protection. The resulting case law exhibits a
dearth of critical engagement on the meaning of sexually explicit texts.
A very brief history of the regulation of sexually explicit speech
The most significant starting point for U.S. law on sexual expression
is Roth v. United States,50 a 1957 case in which the Supreme Court laid out
its first modern test for unprotected obscene speech. In Roth, a bookseller
was prosecuted for using the postal service to sell and distribute allegedly
obscene, sexually explicit materials in violation of federal law.51 The
bookseller, Samuel Roth, argued that the law violated his First Amendment
right to free expression, but the Court unsurprisingly upheld his conviction
because obscenity is “not within the area of constitutionally protected speech
or press,” meaning the government could regulate it freely.52 Further, the
Roth majority announced a rough standard of obscenity: “whether to the
average person, applying contemporary community standards, the dominant
theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to prurient interest.”53

48
See, e.g., Trevor Timm, Technology Law Will Soon be Reshaped by People Who
Don’t
Use
Email,
THE
GUARDIAN
(May
3,
2014),
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/may/03/technology-law-us-supremecourt-internet-nsa.
49
See, e.g., BOB WOODWARD & SCOTT ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN: INSIDE THE
SUPREME COURT (1979); TED CRUZ, A TIME FOR TRUTH: REIGNITING THE PROMISE OF AMERICA
(2015).
50
Roth, 354 U.S. 476.
51
Id.
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Id. at 485.
53
Id. at 489.
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The Roth standard held for only a decade until the Supreme Court
decided Memoirs v. Massachusetts.54 In Memoirs, the Massachusetts
government argued that John Cleland’s Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure, a
novel published in 1748 that detailed the life of an English sex worker, was
legally obscene.55 The Court determined the book, despite any offensiveness,
was not obscene because it was not “utterly without redeeming social
value.”56 In Memoirs, the Court clarified the Roth standard with a threeprong test that must “coalesce” for speech to be obscene: (a) the dominant
theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to a prurient interest in sex;
(b) the material is patently offensive because it affronts contemporary
community standards relating to the description or representation of sexual
matters; and (c) the material is utterly without redeeming social value.57 Most
importantly, the Court explained that for speech to be obscene it must be
entirely without value; even speech with only a “modicum of social value”
was worthy of protection.58 The Memoirs standard was a win for free speech
advocates because it required the utter absence of value to strip a work of
First Amendment protection. In the decade following Memoirs, the Court
decided nearly 45 obscenity cases without sustaining an obscenity
conviction.
But changes to the composition of the Court near the end of the
1960s brought monumental changes in the law of sexual expression. In June
1973, the Court handed down three doctrine-shifting opinions: Miller v.
California,59 Paris Adult Theater I v. Slaton,60 and Kaplan v. California.61
Miller involved the prosecution of mailing obscene advertisements;62 Paris
Adult Theater I reviewed the powers of a local government to enjoin an adult
movie theater from showing allegedly obscene films to consenting adults;63
and Kaplan concerned the conviction of an adult bookstore proprietor for
selling a “plain-covered” but sexually explicit book.64 In these opinions, the
Court ruled on an array of issues related to states’ ability to enjoin the
distribution of obscene sexual expression, including the now-prevailing
Miller obscenity test, which asks: (a) whether ‘the average person, applying
contemporary community standards’ would find that the work, taken as a
54
A Book Named “John Cleland’s Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure” v. Att’y Gen.
of Com. of Mass., 383 U.S. 413 (1966).
55
Id.
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Id. at 420.
57
Id. at 418.
58
Id. at 420-21.
59
Miller, 413 U.S. 15.
60
Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973).
61
Kaplan v. California, 413 U.S. 115 (1973).
62
Miller, 413 U.S. 15.
63
Paris Adult Theatre I, 413 U.S. 49.
64
Kaplan, 413 U.S. 115.
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whole, appeals to the prurient interest; (b) whether the work depicts or
describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined
by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks
serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.65
But when the Miller test was established, individual parts of the test
remained undefined, which required the Court to clarify the test in
subsequent cases. For example, in Jenkins v. Georgia, which involved an
obscenity conviction of a Georgia theater manager for showing the film
“Carnal Knowledge,” the Court clarified that “patently offensive” must
“depict or describe patently offensive ‘hard core’ sexual conduct,”66 such as
“representations or descriptions of ultimate sexual acts, normal or perverted,
actual or simulated,” or “representations or descriptions of masturbation,
excretory functions, and lewd exhibition of the genitals.”67 However, the
value question under Miller remained governed by somewhat amorphous
national standards rather than a discrete community standard.68 Collectively,
these cases defined the speech-restrictive aspects of Miller but failed to
provide clarity about its redemptive value prong, which made for an
especially restrictive First Amendment doctrine.
Context and media: some problems in the post-Miller landscape
Since Miller, the Supreme Court has heard many cases involving
sexually explicit speech, addressing challenges to search and seizure
procedures,69 censorship schemes,70 licensing schemes,71 advertising
regulations,72 jury instructions,73 and protections for specific types of
65

Miller, 413 U.S. at 24.
Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 160 (1974).
67
Id.
68
Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291 (1977); Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497 (1987).
69
See, e.g., Fort Wayne Books, Inc. v. Indiana, 489 U.S. 46, 63 (1989). The Court
established that materials challenged as obscene cannot be seized and removed from
circulation until officially found obscene, “While a single copy of a book or film may be
seized and retained for evidentiary purposes based on a finding of probable cause, the
publication may not be taken out of circulation completely until there has been a
determination of obscenity after an adversary hearing.” Id.
70
See, e.g., Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965). From the 1950s to the 1980s,
it was common for local governments to use censorship systems, like prior review of movies,
to screen for obscene content, but the Court ruled that such systems had to include safeguards,
such as prompt judicial review, to prevent unfair censorship.
71
See, e.g., FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215 (1990).
72
See, e.g., Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463 (1966). The Court established
that the ways in which sexual but non-obscene content is advertised, such as exploiting the
material for its sexual content, can lead the material to qualify as obscene.
73
See, e.g., Pope, 481 U.S. 497. There was confusion in the lower courts about the
instructions to juries on how to apply the three prongs of the Miller test for obscenity. In Pope,
the Court held that, while the first two prongs of the Miller test may be determined based on
66
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sexually explicit speech such as nude dancing.74 In each of these cases, the
Court recognized that perceptions of sexually explicit speech vary by context
and community.75 As a result, the Court never committed to a single
definition of “pornographic” or “indecent.”
The protection for sexually explicit speech depends on a variety of
factors, such as the audience viewing the speech,76 the medium through
which the speech is accessed,77 the physical space in which the speech is
accessed,78 the state interests for regulating the speech,79 and, of course, the
speech itself.80 Legal researchers have written extensively on how protection
for sexually explicit speech depends heavily on contextual factors. For
example, Milagros Rivera-Sanchez examined the FCC’s dismissed
contemporary community standards, the third prong must be determined based on whether a
reasonable person would find value in the material. Id. at 500.
74
Sexually explicit speech takes many different forms, and the Court has addressed a
variety of forms of such speech. City of Erie, 529 U.S. 277 (analyzing restrictions on nude
dancing); Se. Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975) (analyzing restrictions on live
adult entertainment); Playboy Ent. Grp., 529 U.S. 803 (analyzing restrictions on adultoriented cable channels); Sable Commc’ns of California, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989)
(analyzing regulations on dial-a-porn/phone sex services).
75
The Court determined that obscenity (Miller, 413 U.S. 15), child pornography
(Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103 (1990)), and indecent content on broadcast during daytime
programming (FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978)) are unprotected by the First
Amendment.
76
The Court was most concerned about protecting minors from exposure to sexually
explicit speech. See, e.g., United States v. Am. Library Assoc., Inc., 539 U.S. 194 (2003);
Playboy Ent. Grp., 529 U.S. 803; Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986);
Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726; Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
77
The Supreme Court has “long recognized that each medium of expression presents
special First Amendment problems,” Se. Promotions, Ltd., 420 U.S. at 557 (citing Red Lion
Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969) and Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495
(1952)).
78
Sexually explicit speech, both obscene and non-obscene, is legal in the privacy of
one’s home: “[i]f the First Amendment means anything, it means that a State has no business
telling a man, sitting alone in his own house, what books he may read or what films he may
watch. Our whole constitutional heritage rebels at the thought of giving government the power
to control men’s minds.” Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969). But sexually explicit
speech may be regulated or outlawed when accessed in public. See Paris Adult Theatre I, 413
U.S. 49.
79
State interests in regulating sexually explicit speech include protecting vulnerable
audiences, like minors (Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, protecting social order and morale
(Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569 (1998); Erznoznik v. City of
Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 204 (1975); Paris Adult Theatre I, 413 U.S. 49), and preventing the
secondary effects of sexually explicit speech, such as increased crime and decreased property
values (Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. at 425; City of Erie, 529 U.S. 277; Barnes v. Glen
Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560 (1991); City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41
(1986); Young, 427 U.S. 50).
80
The Court determined that obscenity (Roth, 354 U.S. 476), child pornography
(Ferber, 458 U.S. 747), and indecent content on broadcast during daytime programming
(Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 were unprotected by the First Amendment).
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indecency complaints and determined that the communicative context of
sexually explicit speech is especially crucial to its protection on broadcast
media.81 According to Rivera-Sanchez, sexually explicit speech in a
humorous or non-educational programming context is more likely to be
penalized by the FCC than sexually explicit speech used in purely
educational, non-entertainment contexts.82 Similarly, Stephen Sher
determined the purpose of sexually explicit speech drives its level of
protection. Analyzing the decency provisions put in place by the National
Endowment for the Arts (NEA), Sher revealed that the Court gives variable
protection to speech that lies on the border between artistic indecent speech
and non-artistic indecent speech (i.e., pornography), with more protection
given to speech that is believed to have artistic merit, like nude dancing.83
Finally, researcher David Cole determined that the protection for sexually
explicit speech depends greatly on its social acceptability over time rather
than specific material aspects of the expression in a given moment. The
Court is often concerned that sexually explicit speech brings private behavior
into the public sphere. 84 Cole argues that society represses speakers “who
challenge the public/private line by making public sexual matters that the
majority would prefer remained private.”85 This creates a system in which
protection for sexually explicit speech depends on how much the speech
violates deeply engrained social standards of decency and how much the
speech breaks the spheres of public and private behavior.86
Across a wide array of contexts and content, the Court consistently
classifies sexually explicit speech according to its lesser quantum of social
value.87 It expresses this concept linearly: the more speech is perceived as
aiding in social progress or promoting the exchange of ideas, the more
81

Milagros Rivera-Sanchez, How Far Is Too Far? The Line Between “Offensive” and
“Indecent” Speech, 49 FED. COMM. L.J. 327, 328 (1997).
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Id. at 328.
83
Stephen N. Sher, The Identical Treatment of Obscene and Indecent Speech: The
1991 NEA Appropriations Act, 67 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1107, 1131-32 (1991).
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David Cole, Playing by Pornography’s Rules: The Regulation of Sexual Expression,
143 U. PA. L. REV. 111, 115 (1994).
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Id.
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Id. at 131.
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See, e.g., Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942). In
Chaplinsky, the Court upheld the conviction of a Jehovah’s Witness who was charged with
breaching the peace, stating, “There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of
speech, the prevention and punishment of which have never been thought to raise any
Constitutional problem. These include the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and
the insulting or ‘fighting’ words—those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to
incite an immediate breach of the peace. It has been well observed that such utterances are no
essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth
that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in
order and morality.” (internal citations omitted). Chaplinsky remains good law that guides the
hierarchical or low-value approach.
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valuable speech is perceived to be. But is this distinction based on anything
real? As a social fact, is sexually explicit speech really low-value? And if so,
what justifications and decisions do the Supreme Court make to reach such
a significant conclusion? In the near half-century since the United States
Supreme Court decided Miller v. California, the U.S. experienced a digital
revolution that changed the availability of information and media and a
political revolution that challenged social norms around love, marriage, and
sex.88 With those revolutions came changes to the landscape of sexually
explicit speech. The number of web pages containing sexually explicit media
reaches into the millions,89 entire radio and podcast channels are dedicated
to answering questions about sex and relationships,90 and mainstream
entertainment depicts actors discussing sexual issues, such as sexually
transmitted diseases and pornography use.91 Despite this progress, the
doctrine related to sexually explicit speech has remained relatively stable;
sexually explicit speech receives minimal First Amendment protection and
it is still perceived as low-value.92 But seldom have courts, including the
Supreme Court, explicitly discussed the relative value of sexually explicit
speech compared to core protected speech under the First Amendment. The
snapshot of cases from Young v. American Mini Theatres to City of Erie v.
Pap’s A.M. provides a window into this harm-value conundrum related to
sexually explicit speech.
Sexually explicit speech and theories of value
Broadly, the case analysis reveals a clear split in how the justices
articulate whether and to what extent sexually explicit speech, which falls at
the borderlines of constitutional protection, retains value for First
Amendment purposes. Starting in Young v. American Mini Theatres, the
justices diverged dramatically in the theoretical frameworks applied to the
conundrum of sexually explicit speech. Justices amenable to robust
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See, e.g., Barry Leiner et al., A brief history of the Internet, 39 ACM SIGCOMM
COMPUT. COMM. REV. 22 (2009).
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regulation of sexually explicit speech employed the rhetoric and theory of
the marketplace of ideas framework. They posited that sexually explicit
speech is unrelated to the communication of ideas or beliefs. Yet, as
discussed earlier, the justices neither fully explain the logic behind that
conclusion, nor do they entertain the possibility that the market has rendered
a value judgment in favor of sexual content. On the other hand, justices
predisposed to protecting sexually explicit speech gravitate toward
autonomy-based justifications for limiting the government’s attempts to
stifle it.
Young v. American Mini Theatres perfectly captures the dialogue of the
Court’s interpretive conundrum. Justice John Paul Stevens, writing for the
majority in Young argued, “[T]here is surely a less vital interest in the
uninhibited exhibition of material that is on the borderline between
pornography and artistic expression than in the free dissemination of ideas
of social and political significance.”93 Perhaps unintentionally, the Court
sanctioned the belief that adult film is not operating the marketplace of social
and political ideas. It relegated so-called “borderline” speech, unabashedly
on the basis of its content and the identity of the speakers, into specific
government-regulated physical spaces.94 As discussed above, the majority
did not shy away from the fact that this is a content-based regulation. It
claimed instead that this sort of content-based regulation for borderline
speech poses less of a free speech problem than a regulation aimed at a more
obvious exposition of ideas.
According to the Court, one of the chief justifications for upholding
the zoning laws at issue in Young v. American Mini Theatres is the
assumption that protected sexually explicit speech categorically lacks
societal importance:
Moreover, even though we recognize that the First Amendment
will not tolerate the total suppression of erotic materials that have
some arguably artistic value, it is manifest that society’s interest
in protecting this type of expression is of a wholly different, and
lesser, magnitude than the interest in untrammeled political debate
that inspired Voltaire’s immortal comment. Whether political
oratory or philosophical discussion moves us to applaud or to
despise what is said, every schoolchild can understand why our
duty to defend the right to speak remains the same. But few of us
would march our sons and daughters off to war to preserve the
citizen’s right to see “Specified Sexual Activities” exhibited in the
theaters of our choice. Even though the First Amendment protects
communication in this area from total suppression, we hold that
93
94
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the State may legitimately use the content of these materials as the
basis for placing them in a different classification from other
motion pictures.95
However, the Court made this determination without inspecting the works in
question or the role that adult film theaters might play in how adults engage
with ideas on the subjects of sex and sexuality. In Justice Stevens’s view, the
Court can make this constitutional maneuver because the “market for
[pornography] is essentially unrestrained.”96 According to the majority, if the
ordinance in Young had been more expressly focused on specific viewpoints
expressed in certain adult films and not on channeling an entire category of
speech into particular physical spaces, this may have posed an
insurmountable constitutional problem. 97
The interpretive conundrum seemed to blossom in FCC v. Pacifica
Foundation, a landmark case in which Justice Stevens, the author of the
majority opinion in Young, argued that George Carlin’s famous “Filthy
Words” monologue fell outside the scope of full First Amendment protection
when communicated via broadcast technology. Justice Stevens asserted,
“While some of these references may be protected, they surely lie at the
periphery of First Amendment concern.”98 However, he never explained
why.
At this point, the Court’s conclusory reasoning is not especially
notable. But what is notable is how Justice Stevens framed the First
Amendment question. He wrote, “If there were any reason to believe that the
Commission’s characterization of the Carlin monologue as offensive could
be traced to its political content—or even to the fact that it satirized
contemporary attitudes about four-letter words—First Amendment
protection might be required. But that is simply not this case.”99 This asks
whether the speaker-claimant in a First Amendment challenge can prove that
the government has targeted an ideological, and thus presumptively valuable,
message or merely targeted the message’s offensiveness. Justice Stevens’s
opinion in Pacifica, built upon the foundation cemented in Young, leaves
courts today with an intractable circularity problem. If a court must discern
whether the government is targeting offensiveness, it must first interpret both
the speaker’s message and the government’s response. This necessarily
injects the jurist’s subjective interpretation into what is intended to be an
objective exercise in First Amendment categorization. This, the majority in
Cohen v. California ruled, the government may not do, recognizing the risks
95
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of leaving interpretive power in the hands of government actors.100 Justice
Lewis F. Powell echoed that sentiment in his concurrence in Pacifica, which
highlighted his disagreement with Justice Stevens’s approach dating back to
Young:
I do not subscribe to the theory that the Justices of this Court are
free generally to decide on the basis of its content which speech
protected by the First Amendment is most ‘valuable’ and hence
deserving of the most protection, and which is less ‘valuable’ and
hence deserving of less protection.101
Indeed, as fans and scholars of Carlin’s work have noted, the social value of
Carlin’s commentary on linguistic taboos was inextricably tied to its
offensiveness and the listener’s subsequent grappling with it.102
Powell’s concurrence in Pacifica provided powerful, though ultimately
unsuccessful, support for a First Amendment theory of value rooted in
listener autonomy. As the Court continued to grapple with cases involving
sexually explicit speech, this theoretical framework appeared to secure some
semblance of a foothold as the pure marketplace of ideas metaphor faded in
these few cases. In United States v. Playboy, the penultimate case in the
Young lineage, the Court embraced autonomy theory more forcefully. United
States v. Playboy involved a First Amendment challenge to FCC regulations
requiring cable companies delivering adult material to scramble their signal
to prevent non-subscribing households from receiving any sound or images
of adult content through “signal bleed” into other cable channels.103
The Court struck down the regulatory scheme on First Amendment
grounds, holding that it could not survive strict constitutional scrutiny
required for content-based regulations of speech carried over privately built
and operated technological infrastructure.104 Justice Anthony Kennedy’s
majority opinion embraced the individual autonomy justification for limiting
government control over cable content:
The Constitution exists precisely so that opinions and judgments,
including esthetic and moral judgments about art and literature,
can be formed, tested, and expressed. What the Constitution says
is that these judgments are for the individual to make, not for the
100
101

at 63–73).
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Government to decree, even with the mandate or approval of a
majority. Technology expands the capacity to choose; and it
denies the potential of this revolution if we assume the
Government is best positioned to make these choices for us.105
The only mention of markets involved the Court’s discussion of the efficacy
of various market-based solutions for cable companies to prevent delivery of
potentially offensive content to users who might be so offended. “The
citizen,” Justice Kennedy argued, “is entitled to seek out or reject certain
ideas or influences without Government interference or control.”106 For
Justice Kennedy, the citizen and not the market took primacy.
Although United States v. Playboy seemed to indicate full-throated
support for the proposition that the government may not single out private
businesses trafficking in adult material, the Court reversed course in the same
term in City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M. The Pap’s A.M. case involved a First
Amendment challenge to a ban on public nudity brought by an adult
nightclub that featured fully nude dancing for entertainment on its
premises.107 The Court ultimately ruled that the regulation passed First
Amendment scrutiny because it amounted to a constitutional limitation on
expressive conduct that was unrelated to the suppression of free
expression.108 The Court in City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M. relied heavily on
Justice Stevens’s conclusory dicta in Young v. American Mini Theatres:
[E]ven though we recognize that the First Amendment will not
tolerate the total suppression of erotic materials that have some
arguably artistic value, it is manifest that society’s interest in
protecting this type of expression is of a wholly different, and
lesser, magnitude than the interest in untrammeled political
debate.109
Interestingly, Justice Stevens dissented in City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., not
because of any epiphany that adult entertainment possessed more
constitutional value than he acknowledged in Young, but because he
considered the total ban on a form of erotic message to be an unconstitutional
government overstep in the way that using zoning law to cluster or channel
expressive businesses was not. 110
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The legacy of Justice Stevens’s opinion in Young is that the
government is given broad authority to foist regulatory burdens on adult
content that jurists consider less valuable so long as it does not ban the speech
entirely. The prevailing theory, despite some backlash, is that the market will
respond to protect adult content if it is indeed valuable. The case law,
however, has built in several powerful predeterminations of value and
marketability despite pushback from jurists like Justice Powell and Justice
Kennedy who raised concerns about encroachments on citizen autonomy in
the mutual exchange of ideas. Thus continues a classic First Amendment
conundrum: How, if at all, can the Supreme Court adopt an appropriate
theoretical framework for value without tainting its own rulings with the
interpretive gloss of the individual justices who rotate through the chambers?
The most likely answer is that the Court cannot promise that. Fortunately,
the Court has an available path toward resolving both the categorical
conundrum and the interpretive conundrum if it can resolve a key evidentiary
conundrum.
THE EVIDENTIARY CONUNDRUM
In Roth v. United States, the Court stated, “The protection given
speech and press was fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for
the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people.”111
If we take the Court at its word, then the doctrine of sexually explicit speech
must give substantial weight to citizens’ preferences for borderline speech.
The challenge in this area has been adequately capturing both the core
purpose of the First Amendment and the diversity of ways that sexually
explicit speech promotes potentially unpopular social ideas112 with differing
levels of abstraction and sometimes through various forms of expressive
conduct.
Unsurprisingly, the Court has not given much explicit guidance on
whether or how it will use empirical evidence to answer First Amendment
questions. The Supreme Court is not, at least explicitly, a factfinding body.
It seldom reconsiders factual circumstances or it does not explicitly weigh
the probative value of evidence in the cases it hears. In rare cases involving

111
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serious implications for social institutions such as marriage,113
employment,114 and voting,115 the Court has been willing to engage with
empirical evidence. However, the cases examined here reflect a profound
reluctance among the majority of the justices during the period studied to
second-guess lower courts’ factual determinations arising out of empirical
studies. What is especially troubling about the Court’s deference to
lawmakers is that in several of these key cases, the record reveals glaring
instances of unfounded assumptions of third-party harm that clearly burden
certain content and certain speakers without empirical justification.
Judicial deference and empirical evidence
The Court’s application of the secondary effects doctrine in Young
v. American Mini Theatres rested on evidence from sociologists, urban
planners, and unidentified laypersons who predicted that concentrations of
adult establishments would lead to the erosion of Detroit’s economic
vitality.116 The Detroit Common Council found that adult establishments,
“because of their very nature, are recognized as having serious objectionable
operational characteristics, particularly when several of them are
concentrated under certain circumstances thereby having a deleterious effect
upon the adjacent areas.”117 But rather than regulating the operational
characteristics of such establishments directly, the Detroit Common Council
passed, and the Supreme Court upheld, the zoning regulations that limited
the permitted locations for the establishments themselves on the basis of the
types of films they exhibited. One important piece of the precedent from
Young is the Court’s firm refusal to second-guess the Common Council’s
motives or the strength of the evidence justifying the sweeping regulation:
It is not our function to appraise the wisdom of its decision to
require adult theaters to be separated rather than concentrated in
the same areas. In either event, the city’s interest in attempting to
preserve the quality of urban life is one that must be accorded high
respect.118
The Court generally passed on the opportunity to discuss the weight
of the evidentiary or technology policy arguments at issue in the landmark
FCC v. Pacifica Foundation case, opting instead to defer to the FCC’s own
113
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findings regarding the threats posed by sexually explicit media on broadcast
and its determination that the Carlin monologue was legally indecent.119
Conceptually at least, the Court took for granted the FCC’s position that
broadcast technologies presented unique threats by exposing unwitting
listeners, especially minors, to objectionable material.120 We do not quibble
with the Court’s sensible determination that broadcast technology is a unique
medium and that its technological characteristics should have some bearing
on how courts analyze the context and circumstances surrounding potentially
offensive broadcasts, but the Court’s commitment to evidentiary deference
is noteworthy. The issue of evidentiary deference that characterized Young
and Pacifica truly came to a head in United States v. Playboy, which
involved considerable dispute over the level of evidence required to justify
a sweeping federal regulation on sexually explicit speech.
The evidentiary conundrum discussed here presents a core question: what is
the nature and extent of evidence required to sustain a restriction on protected
sexually explicit speech? Young suggests that in secondary effects cases,
restrictions on an entire class of speakers or content could be justifiable on
the basis of some reasonable modicum of evidence, a minimal standard121.
But in United States v. Playboy, the Court appeared open to a heightened
evidentiary requirement that calls for probative evidence that the harms the
government cites are real and likely to be experienced by a substantial
proportion of the population the government seeks to protect.122
As discussed above, Congress passed Section 505 of the
Telecommunications Act to address “signal bleed,” the problem of sexually
explicit images creeping over from adult cable channels into channels
intended for general audiences.123 Although the categorization and
interpretative conundrums puzzled the Court, one of the most significant
disputes among the Supreme Court justices, in dialogue with Congress and
the lower courts, involved the evidence presented by the government that
signal bleed was a serious problem capable of being addressed by legislative
restrictions on cable operators. As summarized by the three-judge panel
sitting in the United States District Court for the District of Delaware, the
government relied primarily on purportedly compelling anecdotal evidence
of bleeding signals affecting unsuspecting and sensitive customers who did
not want to receive Playboy’s cable content.124
Unlike its approach in Young or Pacifica, the Supreme Court
explicitly questioned the paucity of empirical evidence justifying the signal
119
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bleed provision in Section 505. Although Congress possessed evidence that
nearly 39 million homes with approximately 29.5 million children might be
exposed to signal bleed, the evidence did not show the significance of the
harmful effects as they would be experienced in real-life households. The
Court questioned whether the regulation met the strict scrutiny standard,
which requires showing that the regulation is necessary to achieve a
compelling government interest. 125There was some evidence that the
potential for harm was broad, but no indication in the majority’s eyes that
the harm was qualitatively significant. Specifically, the Court pointed out
that there was “no probative evidence in the record which differentiates
among the extent of bleed at individual households and no evidence which
otherwise quantifies the signal bleed problem.”126 “Without some sort of
field survey,” Justice Anthony Kennedy wrote, on behalf of the majority, “it
is impossible to know how widespread the problem in fact is, and the only
indicator in the record is a handful of complaints.”127 Despite the dissent’s
plea to grant regulators more empirical leeway,128 Playboy demonstrates that
over time, the judicial deference at the core of Young and Pacifica had
perhaps given way to healthy scientific skepticism as new methods of private
content delivery, such as cable and internet, became available in homes.
However, the Court’s apparent willingness in Playboy to engage in
scientific dialogue does not resolve the evidentiary conundrum. In City of
Erie v. Pap’s A.M., the justices struggled with core scientific issues of
external validity and generalizability.129 In passing its public nudity ban that
ultimately targeted adult clubs, the City of Erie relied on evidence of adult
establishments’ harmful secondary effects.130 The problem with the
evidentiary record in City of Erie is that it consisted entirely of evidence
introduced in the Supreme Court’s earlier cases in Young v. American Mini
Theatres and City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres. Over Pap’s A.M.’s
counsel’s objections, the Court endorsed this approach:
And in terms of demonstrating that such secondary effects pose a
threat, the city need not “conduct new studies or produce evidence
independent of that already generated by other cities” to
demonstrate the problem of secondary effects, so long as whatever
evidence the city relies upon is reasonably believed to be relevant
to the problem that the city addresses.131
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The City of Erie apparently relied on its own “findings” to support its
regulation of adult business, although the Court only cited the preamble of
the ordinance at issue in City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., and not the evidence
itself:
[T]he Council of the City of Erie has, at various times over more
than a century, expressed its findings that certain lewd, immoral
activities carried on in public places for profit are highly
detrimental to the public health, safety and welfare, and lead to the
debasement of both women and men, promote violence, public
intoxication, prostitution and other serious criminal activity.132
Reasonable belief should not carry the day in matters that can be investigated
by rigorous social science, especially in legal terrain that requires
intermediate, if not heightened strict, scrutiny. Likewise, government
regulations that rely merely on vague conceptualizations of harm (i.e.
“debasement of both women and men”) must fail if they do no more than
assert a social harm without substantial empirical support.
The Court’s preference for deference in cases involving small adult
businesses but interest in field surveys investigating harms caused by
massive private cable operators lacks logical soundness necessary to form
coherent doctrine. However, of the three conundrums highlighted here, the
evidentiary conundrum is the one most amenable to resolution, provided that
the Court is willing to follow its own recent rulings and applications of
heightened scrutiny where certain speakers or content are singled out for
disparate treatment by lawmakers.133 The sexually explicit speech cases have
attracted a cadre of amici curiae, demonstrating heightened interest in
appealing to the Court’s considerations of social science and empirical
evidence through appellate advocacy. It is in this robust amicus strategy that
the Court might find help in resolving an otherwise hopelessly contradictory
set of doctrines that limit discourses on sex.
The emergence of amicus strategy in sexually explicit speech cases
For each of the cases analyzed here, a wide variety of organizations
(from legal scholars to nudist groups) submitted amicus briefs for the Court
to consider the groups’ insights on the law of sexually explicit speech and
the implications of the docketed cases. As previously discussed, in the earlier
cases of Young and Pacifica, the Court deferred to the regulatory bodies and
132
133
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their claims without contending with the evidence of purportedly harmful
effects of sexually explicit speech. But in Playboy and City of Erie, the Court
drew significant attention to the scientific evidence for its decisions, which
may be the result, in part, of the submitted amicus briefs.
The subject of harm resulting from signal bleed (an empirical
question), was at the core of United States v. Playboy and the government’s
proposed regulatory scheme for sexually explicit adult cable channels.134
Submitted to the Court were a series of amicus briefs, but two—of opposing
positions—focus on the evidence of these harms. The first, submitted by a
collection of “sexuality scholars, researchers, educators, and therapists,”
argues that there is no scientific evidence of psychological harms
experienced by signal bleed.135 Citing to a collection of health experts, the
group called on the Court to disregard the government’s claims of harms and
to find no compelling governmental interest in shielding minors from
“sexually explicit” or “indecent” signal bleed.136 Conversely, a collection of
family and morality groups submitted to the Court a brief with research
arguing that such signal bleed was, indeed, dangerous because even the
slightest exposure encourages children to access sexually explicit speech, a
“detriment” to children’s sexual development,137 thus regulation to stem
signal bleed is necessary and justified. The Court did not acknowledge or
cite to either of these briefs in its opinion, but the debate and role of empirical
evidence weighed heavily in the Court’s decision in Playboy, which
ultimately concluded that the scientific record was insufficient to justify the
sweeping regulation on signal bleed.
Debate over empirical evidence again manifested in City of Erie v.
Pap’s A.M. when the Court considered the constitutionality of a total ban on
public nudity aimed at stemming harmful secondary effects of nude dancing
on community property values and crime rates.138 Particularly compelling in
the opinion was an amicus brief submitted by the First Amendment Lawyers
Association which provided extensive research on the impact—or lack
thereof—of nude dancing entertainment. The Association’s brief argued that
three of the four secondary effects studies cited by the City of Erie were
scientifically invalid.139 Specifically, the three challenged studies were not
reliable because they failed at least one of the following checks for scientific
validity: a well-matched control city, sufficient time for study measurement,
134
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a valid measure for “crime,” and the correct survey method/research tool.140
The secondary effects study conducted in Indianapolis, Indiana, for example,
failed three of the four points of scientific validity.141 Furthermore, the one
study that did pass scientific muster, conducted in St. Paul, Minnesota, in
1978, found no negative secondary effects associated with adult
entertainment establishments.142 Despite this extensive evidence provided by
the Association that disproves the government’s claims of negative
secondary effects and nude entertainment, the Court states in its opinion that
“the study relied on by amicus curiae does not cast any legitimate doubt on
the Erie city council’s judgment about Erie.”143 The Court gave no additional
explanation for why it found the Association’s research insufficient. This
decision by the plurality, however, is a source of fracture in the opinion.
In his dissent, Justice David Souter criticized the plurality’s opinion
on the government’s evidence of secondary effects and demanded a greater
evidentiary basis for the nude ban (something he acknowledges he failed to
do in his concurrence in Barnes v. Glen Theatre144). The plurality states that
the preamble of Erie’s nudity ordinance—which states vaguely of “findings”
of detrimental secondary effects from adult entertainment businesses—is
sufficient evidence to support Erie’s regulation.145 But in Justice Souter’s
view, the plurality “seeks to ratchet up the value of mere conclusions by
analogizing them to the legislative facts within an administrative agency’s
special knowledge, on which action is adequately premised in the absence of
evidentiary challenge.”146 Further, Justice Souter contends that this
“evidence” as cited by the plurality is insufficient in the presence of real fact.
Citing to the research provided by the Association, Justice Souter states, “it
is one thing to accord administrative leeway as to predictive judgments in
applying “ ‘elusive concepts’ ” to circumstances where the record is
inconclusive and “evidence ... is difficult to compile,” and quite another to
dispense with evidence of current fact as a predicate for banning a
subcategory of expression.”147 According to Justice Souter, not only did the
City of Erie fail to demonstrate the nudity ban will mitigate the secondary
effects but there lacks sufficient evidence that such harms even exist,
particularly in light of research that empirically reports the opposite.
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The fracture of opinion over the science and evidence in City of Erie
v. Pap’s A.M. best demonstrates the evidentiary conundrum affecting the
Supreme Court’s ability to determine the nature and extent of evidence
required to sustain a restriction on protected sexually explicit speech.
Playboy and Pap’s A.M. indicate the Court’s willingness to engage in
scientific dialogue, but the Court has not settled on a legal standard for
sufficient and substantive evidence in sexually explicit speech cases. This
lack of cohesion, however, may be remedied using expert knowledge, like
the kind found in the submitted amicus briefs.
Earlier, we acknowledged that the Supreme Court is not, at least
explicitly, a factfinding body. Especially in the post-digital era, a time when
data is constantly gathered and peer-reviewed research is readily accessible,
ample expertise is available to assist the Court in evaluating evidentiary
claims. As made evident by the amicus briefs submitted for Playboy and
Pap’s A.M., there are interested and qualified parties from which the Court
can glean knowledge and better inform its decisions. The challenge,
however, is establishing a clear substantiation standard. Without clear and
uniform agreement from the Court on the level of evidence required, a
strategy for relying on knowledge submitted by friends of the courts will be
fruitless.

RECOMMENDATIONS & CONCLUSION
THREE CONUNDRUMS – TWO DISASTERS AND SOME HOPE
In unpacking the Supreme Court’s decisions and justifications for
assigning sexually explicit speech a low-value categorization, this study
revealed three conundrums within the sexually explicit speech case law: the
categorical, the interpretative, and the evidentiary. The Court has created
fractured doctrine, often around their resolutions to these conundrums.
Undoubtedly, the law on sexually explicit speech needs reformation.
Based on the findings from this analysis, we recommend that, in
future cases, the Supreme Court abandon its approaches related to the
categorization or interpretations of sexually explicit speech and its
regulations. It was arguably a noble endeavor by the Court to try to link these
cases using categorization or interpretation, but when faced with the
variability and subjectivity of these cases (ranging from dirty words to dirty
dancing), disaster was likely inevitable. As demonstrated in the analysis,
these practices lead to glaring inconsistencies and fail to unify protections
and regulations of sexually explicit speech. Thus, the Court should dispense
with using these practices in future cases of sexually explicit speech and its
regulations.
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But, to paraphrase the Court, let us not burn down the house to roast
the pig,148 as the evidentiary conundrum is not without remedy. Although
this study revealed the Court has been unclear and inconsistent on the nature
and extent of evidence required to sustain a restriction on protected sexually
explicit speech, leaving it with no clear direction, a workable substantiation
standard could resolve the evidentiary conundrum. This section describes the
proposed standard and applies its key components to the evidentiary
problems presented by secondary effects cases.
First Amendment scrutiny and substantiation in sexually explicit speech
cases
The Supreme Court has long engaged with the conceptual and
practical challenges of analyzing legislative attempts to regulate speech in
the realm of vice. Like speech related to lawful commercial products such as
alcohol149 or tobacco,150 or services such as gambling,151 sexually explicit
speech has frequently drawn interest from legislatures aiming to curb speech
for the purposes of promoting public health and morality.152 We assume as
the Court has, that sexually explicit speech involves a cognizable erotic
message,153 with some modicum of value that brings it within the First
Amendment’s protective reach. Like regulations aimed at valuable
commercial speech associated with potentially harmful vice products, a
workable doctrine of sexually explicit speech must include doctrinal
elements that balance the value of erotic messages against their purported
harms in a manner that satisfies at least intermediate scrutiny. The
commercial speech doctrine and the progeny of the landmark case Central
Hudson Gas & Elec. v. New York Pub. Serv. Comm’n provide the appropriate
framework for balancing the legislative preferences of local governments
with the First Amendment rights of adult content purveyors. It does so by
injecting into the First Amendment analysis a substantiation requirement by
which regulators must demonstrate a minimum level of efficacy for a
regulation to survive First Amendment scrutiny.
Following a conservative realignment of the Supreme Court in the
1980s, commercial speech jurisprudence has undergone seemingly rapid
reformation favoring a fairly exacting, protective standard for commercial
148
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speech, beginning in Central Hudson and ripening in Sorrell v. IMS Health.
In Central Hudson, the Court fashioned a conjunctive, four-pronged test that
a regulation of commercial speech must meet in order to survive intermediate
constitutional scrutiny:
[First], we must determine whether the expression is protected by
the First Amendment. For commercial speech to come within that
provision, it at least must concern a lawful activity and not be
misleading. [Second], we ask whether the asserted governmental
interest is substantial. If both inquiries yield positive answers, we
must [third] determine whether the regulation directly advances
the governmental interest asserted, and [fourth] whether it is not
more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest.154
Insofar as governments seek to regulate lawful commercial speech with an
eye toward ameliorating public health concerns, such as binge drinking155 or
underage smoking,156 the first two prongs represent a minimal hurdle for
legislatures. Central Hudson and its progeny find their teeth in an
increasingly strict third prong, which requires lawmakers to prove that a
regulation on protected commercial speech directly and materially advances
the government’s stated regulatory interest.157
At its heart, the third prong calls for empirical measures of
regulatory efficacy. In 1993, the Supreme Court applied Central Hudson in
Edenfield v. Fane to a Florida regulation that prohibited certified public
accounts from “direct, in-person, uninvited solicitation” of clients.158 The
Florida Board of Accountancy argued that the non-solicitation rule was
necessary to preserve the independent judgment of CPAs who often attest to
the accuracy of audited financial statements.159 After easily finding that the
regulation satisfied the first two prongs of Central Hudson, the Court struck
down the non-solicitation regulation on the grounds that the State of Florida
154
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had failed to introduce sufficient studies or even anecdotal evidence that the
non-solicitation rule directly and materially advanced its interest in
preventing conflicts of interest in the accounting profession.160 Building on
the existing commercial speech standard, the Court emphasized that the
direct-and-material-advancement burden “is not satisfied by mere
speculation or conjecture; rather, a governmental body seeking to sustain a
restriction on commercial speech must demonstrate that the harms it recites
are real and that its restriction will in fact alleviate them to a material
degree.”161
Edenfield strengthened the Central Hudson standard considerably
and also set forth a doctrinal framework for ascertaining the type, quantity,
and character of evidence necessary to support a restriction on protected
commercial speech.162 Only two years later, in Florida Bar v. Went For It,
Inc., the Court upheld a restriction that prohibited attorneys from sending
direct-mail advertising to accident victims (read: potential clients) within
thirty days of a motor vehicle accident.163 Assessing the evidentiary support
for the restriction, the Court found that the State of Florida met the Edenfield
substantiation standard by producing two methodologically sound empirical
studies independently commissioned by the State of Florida that showed that
a substantial percentage of respondents thought that direct-mail attorney
advertising violated victim privacy or undermined public perception of the
judicial system or the attorney profession.164
Failing to meet the evidentiary requirements, the Court struck down
a host of commercial speech restrictions in the years that followed Went For
It, many of which were assertedly rooted in legislative interests in public
health issues. The Edenfield substantiation standard proved pivotal as the
Court explored the contours of the commercial speech doctrine and the third
prong of Central Hudson. For example, the Court dashed a federal ban on
broadcast advertisements for casino gambling finding scant causal links
between advertising and compulsive gambling.165 Similarly, the Court struck
160
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down a federal ban on advertising the strength (measured by alcohol-byvolume) of certain alcoholic beverages citing both conjectural purported
harm and a lack of regulatory efficacy.166 And in 2001, the Court handed a
major victory to Lorillard Tobacco Company after the cigarette manufacturer
challenged a series of regulations aimed at curbing underage smoking, one
of which required point-of-sale advertising for tobacco products to be placed
more than five feet off the ground, supposedly to limit youth exposure to
tobacco ads.167 The so-called five-foot rule failed Central Hudson analysis
in part because it provided “only ineffective or remote support for the
government’s purpose.”168
The Supreme Court put a final punctuation mark in the evolution of
the Central Hudson standard in the 2011 case Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc.,
which involved a Vermont ban on a marketing practice known as
pharmaceutical detailing in which drug manufacturers use prescribing
information to target market pharmaceutical drugs to physicians.169 In
striking down the ban, the Court seemingly strengthened the commercial
speech doctrine further when held that the ban aimed at pharmaceutical
marketers amounted to a speaker-based ban subject to “heightened judicial
scrutiny.”170
The Central Hudson standard’s evolution has been fueled by
governmental attempts to regulate either speech about purportedly harmful
products or purportedly harmful modes of commercial speech and marketing
activity. These concerns closely parallel the public health concerns raised in
many of the cases discussed above involving sexually explicit speech. Yet in
the commercial context, the Court has cautioned, “The First Amendment
directs us to be especially skeptical of regulations that seek to keep people
in the dark for what the government perceives to be their own good.”171 The
Court has also reminded us that market participants ought to have some say
in the value of commercial speech:
The commercial marketplace, like other spheres of our social and
cultural life, provides a forum where ideas and information
flourish. Some of the ideas and information are vital, some of
slight worth. But the general rule is that the speaker and the
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audience, not the government, assess the value of the information
presented.172
Many of the landmark attempts to regulate sexually explicit speech have
called for the Court to consider the constitutionality of such regulations
against the backdrop of society’s interest in sexual expression and its
corresponding social value. But this is the wrong question entirely. For one,
it treats society as a monolith. Additionally, it downplays the role that
empirical social science can play in describing causal relationships between
speech, harm, and social value. On the evidentiary question, there is no
principled reason to treat the consumption of sexually explicit speech in
quasi-private spaces by consenting adults any different than allegedly
harmful speech practices borne out of a purely commercial context,
particularly when governments have the ability to amass an evidentiary
record of the purported harms and the effectiveness of their regulatory
proposals.
The proper inquiry for the Court to undertake is a two-fold analysis
of the government’s rationale for restricting sexually explicit speech on the
basis of a purported harm and the supporting evidence proffered by the
government: First, the Court must determine whether the government has
articulated a sufficiently important interest in regulating protected sexually
explicit speech; Second, the Court must determine the efficacy of the
challenged regulation such that the law reasonably fits the interest in a
manner that is neither overbroad nor unduly burdensome. To sustain a
regulation aimed at protected sexually explicit expression, the government
should have to prove that the harms it recites are real and that the regulation
to alleviate those harms to a material degree without relying merely on
speculation or conjecture.173 By adopting this approach, the Court would
incentivize the introduction of competent and reliable scientific evidence to
support what are ultimately empirical claims about the effects of sexually
explicit speech.
The proposals articulated above give courts ample alternative
choices for meaningful doctrinal reformation. At maximum, they invite the
Court to interpret direct burdens on purveyors of sexually explicit speech for
the content-based restrictions that they are. Given the judiciary’s collective
approval of the low-value approach, however, such a sea change is unlikely.
At minimum, then, the Court ought to consider the more modest proposal of
engrafting a substantiation requirement onto the test of intermediate scrutiny
it frequently uses to resolve constitutional challenges to regulations that
target sexually explicit speech in private domains or quasi-private places of
public accommodation.
172
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Fortunately, this standard is readily adaptable either wholesale from
the commercial speech doctrine or piecemeal from the sexually explicit
speech cases analyzed and discussed in this article. The shift toward a
doctrine grounded in empirical reality is already present in the case law,
albeit among either a soft majority or a cadre of dissenting justices through
the decades. The majority opinion in United States v. Playboy and Justice
Souter’s dissent in City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M. demonstrate that over time, the
judicial deference at the core of Young v. American Mini Theaters and F.C.C.
v. Pacifica Foundation has perhaps given way to healthy scientific
skepticism. Furthermore, reference by the Court to scientific research
provided by the represented parties and in amicus briefs in Playboy and
Pap’s A.M., respectively, suggest a willingness by the Court to not only
require substantive evidence but also to consider knowledge and expertise
outside of the law. To that end, a substantiation standard requiring empirical,
evidentiary support is achievable now, more than ever, because of the
modern availability of scientific evidence and useful data.
At the time Young and Pacifica were decided, an empirical efficacy
standard would have represented an almost insurmountable, albeit
constitutionally consistent, burden. Requiring lawmakers to empirically link
pornography to real social harms and then convincingly argue that a
regulation could alleviate those harms to a material degree might have
proven a bridge too far. But today, particularly for regulations targeting the
purportedly harmful effects of sexually explicit speech, there is no reason for
the Court to not require heightened substantiation given an abundance of
scientifically valid, empirical research available from a variety of fields,
including media effects,174 psychology,175 public health,176 and public
opinion.177 To that point, if and when the Court is asked to consider new or
additional regulation of sexually explicit speech, the Court will find ample
research that suggests U.S. citizens strongly support the freedoms of sexually
explicit speech178 and heightened social acceptance of sexually explicit
174
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speech,179 all while supporting regulations like limiting access for
adolescents and minors.180 In this regulatory environment, state and local
governments are suitable laboratories for experimenting with regulations
that balance public health concerns with First Amendment protections. But
regulatory schemes, like all good experiments, should be scrutinized for
reliability, validity, and the overall presence or absence of empirical support.
Courts are equipped to make these empirical judgments, but they currently
lack the doctrinal mechanisms for assessing the efficacy of strong
regulations on protected sexual expression.
Currently, the conundrums created by the Court’s convoluted
sexually explicit speech cases leave the entire doctrine weak, insufficient,
and outdated. Therefore, we recommend that the Court abrogate its previous
decisions that categorized sexually explicit speech as categorically lowvalue. We urge the Court to categorize restrictions on sexually explicit
speech as content-based and therefore worthy of strict constitutional
scrutiny. But absent that significant doctrinal turn, we recommend adopting
and implementing a substantiation standard for restrictions on sexually
explicit speech that mirrors the commercial speech doctrine’s efficacy
requirements. These recommendations will realign the fractured doctrine of
sexually explicit speech and will create a clearer decision-making framework
that balances the valuable interests in sexually explicit speech against its
potential downstream harms.
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